

cial history develops the theme of his earlier works that France "modernized" in the nineteenth century as a consequence of market integration and the spread of railways; his favorite French phrase is "crise d'adaptation." Although Price's use of "modernization" may stick in the throats of many Anglo-American social historians, he employs it fairly innocuously as shorthand for specific economic processes rather than as a means to describe less tangible changes in mental outlook. Price agrees with David Pinkney that the essential dividing point in the history of modern France was the 1840s, not the French revolution; like Eugen Weber, he sees the era of the long depression of the 1870s and 1880s as the second major turning point, when the innovations of the 1840s bore fruit.

There is much to admire in Price's book. It is well organized and written in a straightforward manner. After an introductory section on economy and demography, Price goes on to discuss major social groups. He closes with chapters on institutions: religion and education with a coda on the state. Each of these subjects is discussed clearly and in depth. As a specialist in the transformation of rural France, Price is especially sensitive to regional differences. One feature that sets his volume apart from other surveys is his judicious use of unpublished French dissertations for local material.

Everyone who teaches and researches French social history would, of course, write a synthetic work in the field differently. Although no one would advocate a longer volume, I would have pushed for a somewhat more expeditious treatment of a host of topics. This approach would have opened up room for the more adventure-some project of bringing together new areas of research in social history, which receive little or no mention in Price's account, and the social history mainstream that he covers so well.

From his early study of the Second Republic through this book, Price has seen his work as a challenge to Marxist historiography on France. For the past two decades, however, many social historians in France and the United States have turned less to Marx for inspiration than to Michel Foucault. These historians have focused their attention on a variety of topics important not only in themselves but also for the ways in which they reveal the attempts of dominant groups to define and control the nature and norms of society, as well as efforts to resist these measures. Works in this vein cover a variety of "marginal" topics that receive little attention in Price's survey: Algeria, the police, crime, prisons, psychology, and, more generally, the anxieties, fears, and their purveyors that Theodore Zeldin probed in *France, 1848-*

1945 (1973 and 1977). Price makes good use of Louise Tilly and Joan Scott's *Women, Work and Family* (1978), except for mislabeling one of their tables on crude birth rates per thousand as "birth rate (percentages)" (p. 223). But greater attention could also have been devoted to questions of gender.

Tackling this more comprehensive project would present challenges because the methodologies and periodizations in the newer fields of social history differ from those in the more traditional regional social histories that provide the core of Price's sources. Yet such an effort could also open up new avenues of inquiry for social historians. Price's work is an excellent summation of past work for students; a different kind of book would be required to set an agenda for future research.

DONALD REID

*University of North Carolina,  
Chapel Hill*

ALBERT BOIME. *Hollow Icons: The Politics of Sculpture in Nineteenth-Century France*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1987. Pp. 163. Cloth \$18.00, paper \$11.00.

Albert Boime, an art historian, has briefly sketched out the politics of sculpture in nineteenth-century France. Given the medium of sculpture, sculptors needed state sponsorship to finance them and to provide the public spaces in which to display their works. Sculptors were thus more dependent on state patronage than painters and tended to be more conservative. Their dependence on the political and economic elites of the day made them support the status quo. Artists seemed perfectly capable of loyalty to the state regardless of changes in regime. Lifelong republicans such as David d'Angers, one of the most brilliant sculptors of the first half of the nineteenth century, did not hesitate to serve the three successive kings of the Restoration and the July Monarchy. David erected symbols that mobilized public opinion in favor of regimes antithetical to his values; he carved the Grand Condé in 1827 and then the pediment of the Pantheon in the 1830s.

Well documented in this book is the preoccupation of the French state with statuary as political statement. For those unacquainted with the subject of this work, it may come as a surprise to discover the extent to which rulers and their ministers busied themselves with public sculpture, concerned lest part of the symbol be misunderstood, demanding of artists changes that in nearly all cases the artists were but too willing to provide.

Governments spent considerable sums destroying statues and symbols of preceding regimes,

restoring those that had been victimized by foes, and building new ones glorifying their supporters. Given the large costs of public statuary, once the work of art had been begun, even if the political situation changed, governments would at times have the monument subtly modified to fit the new situation. Artists did not want to lose the opportunity to have their work erected, and governments did not want to see past expenditures spent in vain.

Boime's method of selection of these works of art is not always clear. According to what principles were sculptors and their works chosen for discussion? The column of Napoleon on the Place de Vendôme, the Arc de Triomphe, and the Pantheon are natural enough choices, but some of the other works seem to have been chosen because they were part of the corpus of a known sculptor rather than because they had any particular political impact. Furthermore, nearly without exception the works discussed are Parisian, which ignores the rich and important statuary in the provinces. The involvement of the central government is also overstressed; much public statuary resulted from the initiatives of local government and private bodies (although Boime brilliantly displays the impact of one such private group in the building of the Statue of Liberty).

Boime seems to have relied exclusively on published materials and to have finished writing the book prior to the appearance of the very useful series (by now four volumes) *Les lieux de la mémoire* (1985–87), edited by Pierre Nora. Some of the essays in that work would have helped Boime further elaborate several of his arguments. Boime's work is highly suggestive but by no means exhaustive. There are rich archival materials in both Paris and the provinces that would allow further development of the large and important themes that Boime has explored.

It is a measure of Boime's success that one would have liked to have read a bigger book that would have told us even more about the iconography of power in nineteenth-century France.

WILLIAM B. COHEN  
Indiana University

THOMAS J. ADRIANCE. *The Last Gaiter Button: A Study of the Mobilization and Concentration of the French Army in the War of 1870*. (Contributions in Military Studies, number 73.) New York: Greenwood Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 174. \$32.95.

"Am in Belfort," General A. E. Michel wired to the French war minister on July 21, 1870. "Cannot find brigade; Cannot find commanding general; What must I do; Do not know where my regiments

are." Michel's well-known *cri de coeur* sums up rather succinctly the perplexity and confusion that reigned in the French army in the summer of 1870. By contrast, Prussian war minister Albrecht von Roon remembered the first two weeks of the Franco-Prussian War, between the dispatch of mobilization orders and the first battles, as among the most relaxed and carefree of his public career, when the mobilization plans drawn up by Helmut von Moltke's staff momentarily lifted the burdens of office from his shoulders.

Thomas J. Adriance reminds us just how *terrible* the opening months of the "*année terrible*" actually were for the French army. Quite apart from the usual indecisiveness of the emperor, the intrigues of his wife, and the utter incompetence of Marshals Bazaine and MacMahon, the French army proved incapable of organizing and supplying its mobilization and concentration. The reasons lay with an intendance that was too small, lacked initiative, endured poor relations with the command, and had too few auxiliary services to support even a relatively small army. These problems made it difficult for the intendance to retrieve the initial mistake of the high command, which decided to dispatch the regular troops to the front, supply them, and then have the reserves join them later. As a consequence, the railroads were hurled into such confusion by the supply effort that few reservists ever reached their units. The French army marched into battle both undersupplied and undermanned.

This study offers, in effect, a brief history of the opening weeks of the Franco-Prussian War until the surrender at Sedan on September 2, 1870 that concentrates on the problems of mobilization and organization and on their impact on the campaign. It is balanced and well written. The author argues that the confusion of mobilization and supply intensified the natural caution of French commanders and limited their strategic options, even had they been inclined to do something more dramatic than simply retreat in confusion. Adriance's analysis is perhaps weakest in explaining why the French were unable to reform a system that they recognized as defective at least as early as 1866, and here the book would have benefited from some of the observations made by Richard Holmes in *The Road to Sedan* (1984). Adriance concludes that, whatever the failings of the French army in 1914, mobilization and supply were not among them and actually contributed to the French *redressment* on the Marne. Perhaps he should make that the subject of his next study.

DOUGLAS PORCH  
*The Citadel*